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An alternative way of viewing the unemployment-inflation trade-
off yields more sensible and more decisive results than the custom-
ary way. It uses the ratio of employment to population of working
age, instead of the unemployment rate, as the variable that measures
the utilization of the potential labor force. This measure avoids the
problem of variation in labor force participation rates, which to some
degree respond to conditions of demand. It avoids the problem of
discouraged workers, who are not counted as unemployed because
they are not seeking work, even though they "want" work in some
sense; obviously they are not employed. It avoids such definitional
problems as the degree to which persons must actively be seeking
work to be considered unemployed or whether they have realistic
ideas about their individual employability, wage aspirations, and so
on.
The record for the postwar period shows a fairly close relationship
between movements in the employment-population ratio and in the
rate of wage or price inflation. This is not the case with the unem-
ployment rate, at least in its raw form. It appears that one of the
factors explaining the persistence of inflation during the 1973—1975
recession, despite the high unemployment rate, was that the percent-
age of persons employed held up relatively well, and this provided
support for wage income and consumer demand. In this regard, the
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moderatedecline in the inflation rate since 1974 was about in line
e with previous experience. P c
The implication is that policymakers and others concerned about nor
the state of the labor market and its bearing on wage and price infla- Pos
tion should pay closer attention than they have to the percentage of
the population employed. Wider reporting of this statistic on a cur- Yea
rent basis, along with the reporting of the unemployment rate and





One of the clichés of the times is that the 1973—1975 recession was
the longest and deepest since the Great Depression of the 1930s. in
Such an appraisal is commonly based on the fact that the unemploy- in
ment rate averaged 8.5 percent during 1975, higher than in any year in since 1941. But the employment ratio, which is the percentage of ces the population employed, gives a contradictory verdict. In so doing, om' it may help solve an economic puzzle—why, in the face of this onl
"worst recession," wages and prices have continued to advance at to
near record rates. put Admittedly, history will probably continue to record the 1973— emr 1975 recession as the worst since the 1930s, particularly since it met
was worldwide. Yet in several significant respects it was in the same the family with the three recessions that occurred in the United States met between 1948 and 1958 and not at all in a class with the Great De-
pression. For example, the decline in nonfarm employment lasted T
ninemonths (September 1974 to June 1975) and came to 3 percent, 1
comparedto declines of fourteen months and 4 percent in 1957— —
1958;sixteen months and 3 percent in 1953—1954; and thirteen
months and 4 percent in 1948—1949. In 1929—1933 the drop in
nonfarm employment lasted forty-three months and reached 32 per-
cent. Industrial production fell 13 percent in 1973—1975 and 12
percent in 1957—1958, but 53 percent in 1929—1932. Real gross
national product dropped nearly 7 percent in 1973—1975 and 4 per-
cent in 1957—1958, but 33 percent in 1929—1932.'
A large part of the reduction in output in 1973—1975 was attrib-
utable to a reduction in inventory investment, which was what hap-
pened in the earlier postwar recessions but not in 1929—1932. This —
probablycontributed to the brevity of the decline in employment,
since inventory movements are usually quickly reversed and do not force
have the longer run implications of a decline in basic demand. The perci
Stati
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line pecuniary volume of business scarcely declined at all in 19731975,
nor did personal income, whereas they declined slightly in the earlier
bout postwar recessions and dramatically in 1929—1932.
fla- The unemployment rate and the employment ratio for the low
e .of years of each of the six recessions since 1949 are given in Table
cur- 13—1. According to the unemployment rate, the latest recession was
and by far the worst. According to the percentage of the population that
o be continued to be employed, it was next to the mildest. Which of these
characterizations is more accurate can be a matter of argument, but
there is no question that they are different.
The two measures give more nearly similar verdicts when the lows
are compared with the previous highs. The rise in unemployment in
the first three recessions was larger than in the next two, and the de-
was dine in the employment ratio also was larger in the first three than
30s. in the next two. Moreover, the rise in unemployment and the decline
by- in the employment ratio both were larger in the 1975 recession than
year in any of the previous five. This measurement of the severity of re-
e of cession depends, of course, partly on the degree to which the econ-
flg, omy enjoyed full employment when the recession began, and not
this only on the amount of slack there was when the economy hit bot-
e at torn. Nevertheless, even by this measure, the unemployment rate
puts the 1975 recession well in front of the others, whereas the
employment ratio does not. According to the decline in the employ-
Ce it ment ratio, the 1973—1975 recession barely exceeded the worst of
ame the earlier postwar recessions; according to the rise in the unemploy-
rates ment rate, it was much worse.
;De-
































Sources: Column(1): Business cycle trough years, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Inc.; column (2): Unemployment as percentage of civilian labor
force, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; and column (3): Civilian employment as
percentage of population sixteen years old and over, U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics.214 Inflation
THE INFLATION TRADE-OFF
Thesealternative ways of looking at the employment situation are
of more than academic concern. Not only do they tell us how peo-
ple are faring in the job market, but they also have a bearing on the
way we interpret the inflation that has accompanied the recession.
If the percentage of the population employed is high, the total earn-
ings of the population are likely to be higher than would otherwise
be the case, and the same holds true for spending capacity. Under
these circumstances, wage rates and prices are likely to remain higher
than they otherwise would. If the unemployment rate is high, on the
other hand, one might expect the opposite conditions: greater down-
ward pressure on wages because of the large numbers seeking work
and hence lower cost pressure on prices. Both propositions must of Sea,
coursebe qualified, because many other factors besides employment norr
and unemployment influence wages and prices. Moreover, the propo-
sitions do not tell what we should expect if employment and unem- fou,
ployment are both at relatively high levels. lam
In 1975, in fact, we had both a high unemployment rate and a
moderately high employment ratio. The employment ratio seems I:
more consistent with the inflationary conditions that existed than witl
does the unemployment rate. Neither the rate nor the ratio can ex- can
plain the whole situation, but the employment ratio does give a clue,
J
plo:
which the unemployment rate alone does not, to determining why bus:
inflation persisted in 1975. Unemployment was a serious problem, relal
but at the same time, a relatively high percentage of the population oth
continued to be employed, and the fact that they were employed degi
helped to sustain demand, wages, and prices. If we ignore this fact, fall
and thereby treat employment and unemployment merely as oppo- in
site sides of the same coin, we may overlook one of the factors that rati
can help explain the current dilemma of high unemployment and D
persistent inflation. tabi
This dilemma has been growing more and more serious since World diag
War II. Although reductions in the rate of inflation have continued to
to accompany recessions (sometimes with a short lag), each succeed- The
ing recession (with a partial exception in 1961) has left the rate of and
inflation in both prices and wages higher than it was left by the re- sho
cession before. As Table 13-2 shows, the steady upward progression anCE
in the rate of increase in hourly compensation, from less than one any
percent at the trough of the 1949 recession to nearly 8 percent at trou
the trough of the 1975 recession, has been matched by a similar pro- han
gression in the rate of increase in consumer prices. relalr Employment, Unemployment, and the In flat/on-Recession Dilemma 215


















Sources: Column (1): Business cycle trough years, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Inc.; column (2): Percentage change in consumer price index,
December of preceding year to December of current year, U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics; column (3):Percentage change in average hourly compensation,
fourth quarter of preceding year to fourth quarter of current year, private non-
farm sector, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
If the figures on prices and wages in Table 13-2 are compared
with those on employment and unemployment in Table 13-1, one
can see why it is important to look at both measures. If the unem-
ployment rate is taken as the measure of slack in the economy at
business cycle lows, one would have to say that it bears virtually no
relation to the rate of increase in either prices or wages. If, on the
other hand, the employment ratio is taken as the measure of the
degree to which there is full employment in the economy, the figures
fall more nearly into place. The high rates of price and wage inflation
in 1970and 1975 correspond with relatively high employment
ratios.
Data for years other than the six recession years covered in these
tables support these results (see Figures 13—1 and 13—2). The two
diagrams on the left-hand side of each figure relate unemployment
to wage changes (Figure 13-1) and to price changes (Figure 13—2).
The two on the right relate the employment ratio to the same wage
and price data. One would expect diagrams using unemployment to
show a scatter of points sloping downward to the right, in accord-
ance with the so-called Phillips curve. It takes a close look to find
any trace of this, though most of the lines connecting the peaks and
troughs of the business cycles do slope downward. On the other
hand, the diagrams using the employment ratio show a much tighter
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































right.The correlation coefficients, which are nearly zero for unem-
ployment but moderately high for employment, confirm this impres-
sion. (For further discussion, see Technical Note 1, below.)
Another way to depict the relation between employment, unem-
ployment, and the rate of inflation is shown in Figure 13-3. The
employment ratio and the rate of change in the consumer price index
have followed nearly parallel courses. The unemployment rate (plot.
ted on an inverted scale) has deviated from both, notably in the early
1950s and again in recent years. Especially noteworthy is the moder-
ate decline in the employment ratio during the recent recession and
Figure13—3.Unemployment Rate, Employment Ratio, and the Rate of Change









































Note: The unemployment rate and employment ratb are twelve month moving averages;
the rate of change in the consumer price index is the percent change over twelve months. All
series are plotted at end of the twelve month period.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. For annual data see Table 13—5.Employment, Unemployment, and the Inflation-Recession Dilemma 221
em- the similarly moderate decline in the rate of inflation, in sharp con-
res- trast with what was happening to the unemployment rate.
One cannot deduce cause and effect from these or any other sets
em- of numbers: they merely make one or another hypothesis more or
he less plausible. In this instance, since alternative measures of slack in
dex the economy behave quite differently, and one (the employment
lot- ratio) bears a plausible and fairly consistent relationship to rates of
any price and wage inflation, while the other (the unemployment rate)
cler- does not, we would be well advised to reconsider our hypotheses
and about the way slack in the economy affects the rate of inflation. The
employment ratio shows that sometimes there may be less slack than
range wouldmeet the eye of one who looks only at the unemployment
rate.
This is indeed the case during the current recovery, which at pres-
2.0 entwriting (May 1976) is about one year old. The unemployment
3 ratein April 1976 was 7.5 percent. By historical standards, such a
rate suggests an enormous amount of slack in the economy, more
4.0 thanin any previous postwar recession year except 1975. It is more
5.0 thanone and a half times as high as the average unemployment rate
during 1948—1974, which was 4.8 percenC The employment ratio,
6.0 onthe other hand, was 56.2 percent in April 1976. It is well above
7.0 theaverage ratio for 1948—1974, which was 55.3 percent. It is also
8.0 wellabove the level of any postwar recession year and, indeed, higher
than in four of the six peak years in the business cycle (1948, 1953,
1957, and 1960). The economy, after a year of recovery, is providing
employment for a relatively large fraction of the population of work-
ing age, though many are still seeking work. Under these conditions,
55 judgingfrom past experience, we should not find it surprising that
54 thepace of wage and price inflation is still a worrisome problem.
53
NATURE OF THE EMPLOYMENT RATIO
'5
Theemployment ratio used in this chapter is not the only available
measure of employment nor even the only employment ratio. It
takes the total population sixteen years of age and over as the poten-
tial labor supply, ignoring the fact that there are many in the popu-
lation who—because of age, illness, affluence, or preoccupation with
other duties—are not likely to become employed under any circum-
stances. It does not count those who are in the armed forces as em-
ployed, but does count them in the population. By using "civilian
pes; employment"in the numerator, it conforms to customary usage in
reports of the number employed. By using total population in the
denominator, it makes a simple allowance for the trend in the popu-222 Inflation
lationof the country or, more specifically, the trend in the number IMI
of persons (apart from children under sixteen) who are largely sup-
ported by those who are employed. Since the size of the armed Th
forces is subject to noneconomic considerations, the alternative treat- the
ments (either adding the armed forces to the employed or subtract- the
ing them from the population) do not seem to yield as satisfactory a Th
ratio for economic analysis as the one adopted, though opinions may to
differ on this point. (For further discussion, see Technical Note 2, dat
below.) dat
The employment ratio avoids some of the definitional questions its
that beset measures of unemployment. For example, the so- called
"discouraged worker," who is not counted as unemployed because of
he or she is not seeking work even though he wants work, is obvi- of
ously not counted as employed. Young people whose principal activ- wo
ity is going to school, but who are counted as unemployed if they are me
seeking part-time work, are not counted as employed unless they cie
actually have a job. Unlike the unemployment rate, the employment pez
ratio does not depend implicitly on the degree to which a person sea
must actively seek work to be considered unemployed, nor does it W1S
depend on whether his ideas are realistic or unrealistic as to employ- PI
ability, earning capacity, the suitability of working conditions, and wh
so on. If he does not have a job, he is not counted as employed. Th
Hence it is both a more objective and a more neutral measure (as well tha
as being, one hopes, less controversial) than the unemployment rate. gr
For example, when the definitions of employment and unemploy- wh
ment were revised in 1967 in response to the recommendations of be
the Gordon Committee (which in turn arose out of a controversy ha
regarding the measurement of unemployment), the revisions altered syr
the unemployment count in 1966 by 3.4 percent but altered the me
employment count by only 0.06 percent.2
If the employment ratio is to receive due attention, however, it to
must be reported promptly and prominently, together with other tho
statistics on the employment situation. At present, it is not so re- tiv
ported. The Bureau of Labor Statistics does not refer to it in its pre
monthly press release, though it does report both the numerator and
the denominator. The bureau does show an employment ratio (the tioi
ratio of civilian employment to civilian population) in its monthly
Chartbook on Prices, Wages and Productivity and in its monthly TE
Emp.5yment and Earnings. Although such notices are helpful, they IN
are not likely to receive much public attention, because they do not INI
appear as promptly as the figures in the monthly press releases.3
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ber IMPLICATIONS
Theprincipal implication of the findings described above is that in
•at- the conduct of economic policy, careful attention should be paid to
ict- the level and change in the percentage of the population employed.
y a This is not to say that unemployment should be ignored. It is simply
• nay to say that evaluations of the labor market based upon employment
e 2 data are not always consistent with those based upon unemployment
data and it is therefore essential for us to analyze the difference and
its implications for wage and price trends.
Ued A high level of unemployment not accompanied by a low level
Luse of employment (relative to population) may not imply a deficiency
bvi- of demand. It may, on the contrary, imply that large numbers of
tiv. workers are seeking jobs, or seeking to change jobs, because employ-
are ment opportunities are plentiful. The existence of numerous vacan-
hey cies, satisfactory wage levels, and good working conditions induce
Lent persons to seek jobs, or to leave jobs that they have in order to
search for better ones, or to take more time than they might other-
it wise take to find the best job they can. For example, many persons,
particularly married women with small children and young people
and who are attending school, can accept only part-time employment.
ed The fact that there are many more part-time jobs available today
well than there were twenty or thirty years ago, partly because of the
ate growth of service industries, induces many to enter the labor force
who would not otherwise have done so. Initially, they are likely to
s of be counted as unemployed. Such changes in both supply and demand
rsy have tended to raise the unemployment rate, but they are not a
bred symptom of inadequate demand, and they do not necessarily call for
the measures to stimulate demand.
More appropriate policies in such instances may be those that help
it to place people in jobs or to train them for jobs that are available or
those that improve productivity and reduce costs, increasing incen-
re- tives to employ people without at the same time putting upward
pressure on prices. By means of such policies, the employment ratio
'and may be raised and unemployment reduced without the usual infla-
the tionary consequences.
hly
I TECHNICAL NOTE 1: LONG-RUN CHANGES
iey IN EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND
not INFLATION RATES
ent In the unemployment diagrams (left-hand panels of Figures 13-1
and 13— 2), there is clear evidence that the unemployment rate asso-
I224 Inflation
ciatedwith a given rate of wage or price inflation has become higher
in recent years than it was formerly. This is one way of accounting
for the apparent lack of association between the two: the Phillips
curve has shifted to the right. This means, of course, that some factor
has caused the unemployment rate to drift upward relative to the
rate of wage or price change. The employment ratio diagrams (right-
hand panels of Figures 13-1 and 13-2) show some evidence of a
similar shift, but to the left. This shift is much less pronounced than
that for unemployment, but insofar as it is present it means that
some factor has caused the employment ratio to drift downward rela-
tive to the rate of wage or price change.4
The employment ratio has tended to drift downward because of
the declining proportion of adult men in the population and the ris-
ing proportion of adult women and teenagers. Since the adult men
have much higher employment ratios than either adult women or
teenagers, a decline in their relative numbers tends to reduce the
overall employment ratio. For example, between 1948 and 1973
(both prosperous years in the business cycle), the proportion of adult
males in the working age population fell from 45 percent to 42 per-
cent, while adult women and teenagers rose from 55 to 58 percent
(see Table 13-3). The percentage of adult males employed in 1948
was eighty-four compared to thirty-three for adult women and teen-
agers; by 1973 the former had dropped to seventy-six, and the latter
had risen to forty-three. As a net result of these offsetting changes
the overall employment ratio rose from 56 to 57 percent, but other
things equal, it would have risen to 58 percent had the composi-
tion of the population remained the same. The shift in composition
caused a downtrend of one percentage point in twenty-five years.
This factor, incidentally, cannot bear any responsibility for the posi-
tive correlation between the employment ratio and the rate of infla-
tion, since the latter has moved upward over the years.
The unemployment rate was affected not only by these demo-
graphic changes but also by the changing propensity of different
groups to enter or leave the labor force. Adult men comprised 67
percent of the labor force in 1948, but only 56 percent in 1973;
adult women and teenagers, entering the labor force in large num-
bers, increased from 33 to 44 percent. These were much larger shifts
than those in the population, and they had a substantial effect on the
overall unemployment rate, which rose from 3.8 to 4.9 percent from
1948 to 1973. Without the shift in labor force composition, the rate
would have risen only half as much, to 4.4 percent. The higher un-
employment rates for adult women and teenagers (4.9 percent in
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bothyears), coupled with their sharp rise in the labor force, added
about half a percentage point to the unemployment rate over the
twenty-five year period. This was a much bigger proportionate shift
than in the employment ratio, since the unemployment rate is a
much smaller figure.
This points to one of the merits of an unemployment ratio (unem-
ployment as a percentage of population of working age) as compared
with the unemployment rate (unemployment as a percentage of
labor force): the population is less affected than is the labor force by
changes in age-sex composition. Short-run as well as long-run changes
in labor force participation affect the behavior of the unemployment
rate. In the population, the long-run changes dominate; they are gen-
erally smaller than in the labor force; and some of them are predict-
able. Some consideration might well be given, therefore, to more
extensive use of the unemployment ratio (see also Technical Note 2,





Someof the factors underlying the fact that the employment ratio is
more closely associated with inflation rates than is the unemploy-
ment rate are illuminated by a correlation analysis involving both
measures.
The total population aged sixteen and over can be divided into
the following groups: (1) civilian employed, (2) armed forces, (3)
unemployed, and (4) not in the labor force. If we divide each of
these by the population sixteen and over and multiply by 100, the
four ratios, which we designate E/P, AlP, U/P, and NL/P, add to
100. The employment ratio, E/P, is equal to 100 minus (A/P +
U/P+NL/P).When the rate of change in prices or wages is regressed
upon these variables, we can determine what each contributes to the
result.
The simple correlation matrix, based upon annual data, 1948—
1974, is given in Table 13—4. From this we learn that the employ-
ment ratio is more highly correlated with the rate of change in con-
sumer prices or hourly compensation than are any of the other
ratios. The armed forces ratio has a slight inverse correlation with the
price and wage variables. The unemployment ratio is slightly corre-
• lated inversely with the price and wage variables.5 The not in the
labor force ratio has a substantial inverse correlation with the price
•LL
w228 Inflation 1
CPI HCE/P A/P U/P NL/P
Consumer price index (CpI)a +1.0
Hourly compensation
(HC)b +0.8+1.0
Employment ratio (E/P) +0.8 +0.8+1.0
Armed forces ratio (AlP) —0.3 —0.2 —0.2+1.0
Unemployment ratio (U/P)—0.1 —0.3 —0.4 —0.6+1.0
Not in labor force ratio
(NL/P) —0.7 —0.6 —0.8 0.0 0.0+1.0
apercent change from December to December.
bPercent change from fourth quarter to fourth quarter.
and wage variables. In terms of these simple correlations, therefore, it
appears that the ratios involving the armed forces, unemployed, and
those not in the labor force belong together in that each appears to
be (if anything) inversely correlated with the rates of change in prices
and wages.
This is confirmed by multiple regressions using the three variables
simultaneously (fitted to annual data, 1948—1974):
R20.62 (13.1)
ACPI= 143.51 —2.98A/P—1.66U/P —3.39NL/P
(7.11)(3.92) (2.75) (6.43)
R20.73 (13.2)
The regression coefficients are all negative and statistically signifi-
cant. The regressions were also computed with a time trend variable,
but the time trend variable was not significant. Since the regression
coefficients are substantially similar in magnitude, the multiple cor-
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Themultiple regressions indicate that the reason the employment
ratio is more highly correlated with price and wage changes than is
the unemployment rate is that the employment ratio implicitly takes
account of two other factors that contribute to the relationship,
these being the percentage of the population not in the labor force
and the percentage in the armed forces. The influence of the not in
the labor force ratio is, on the whole, more powerful than that of the
unemployment ratio, as the following regressions testify:
/HC=84.24—1.02U/P —1.92NL/P R20.41 (13.5)
(3.95)(2.00) (3.56)
1.o
ACPI=143.38—0.32U/P —3.52NL/P R2 =0.54 (13.6)
(5.44)(0.51) (5.29)
e, it The armed forces ratio contributes significantly (and inversely) to
and the correlation, when treated as one of the three sectors outside
to civilian employment, asis shown by a comparison of equations
•ces (12.5) and (12.6) with (12.1 and (12.2). On the other hand, treat-
ing the armed forces as a sector to be included with civilian employ-
bles ment does not significantly improve the correlation, as the following
regressions show:
AHC. =—98.22+1.89E/P—0.27A/P R2 =0.60 (13.7)
(5.34)(5.76) (0.51)
3.1) LCPI =—140.06 +2.63ElF —1.07A/P R2 =0.67 (13.8)
(5.96)(6.29) (1.54)
The persistence of the negative sign on the armed forces ratio is
3.2) puzzling, and it is not clear what the reason for it may be. But it
does suggest that nothing is to be gained in interpreting price and
iifi- wage behavior by using an employment ratio defined to include the
ble, armed forces, which of course would then be counted positively.
ion Similarly, from this point of view, nothing is to be gained by using
an employment ratio defined to exclude the armed forces from the
population, since this also would have the opposite effect to what




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NOTES TO CHAPTER 13
1.In general, measures of activity obtained by deflating dollar values by
price indexes (such as real GNP) showed 1973—197 5 declines sharper in relation
to those in previous recessions than did measures of activity expressed in physi-
cal units (such as man hours, units sold, and so on). Hence it is possible that the
deflation procedure, which is especially hazardous when prices are rising rapidly
• and forcing extensive adjustments in spending habits, contract terms, and ac-
counting procedures, has exaggerated the recent declines in the deflated (con-
stant dollai) aggregates of sales, output, inventories, and incomes. (For revised
data on these measures, see Appendix Table A-2.)
2. See Robert L. Stein, "New Definitions for Employment and Unemploy-
ment," Employment and Earnings and Monthly Report on the Labor Force
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics), February 1967, Table 1.
3. A useful analysis of the employment ratio in comparison with the unem-
ployment rate and related measures is Julius Shiskin (Commissioner of Labor
Statistics), "Employment and Unemployment: the Doughnut or the Hole?"
Monthly Labor Review 99, no.2 (February 1976): 3—10. See also Chapter 7.
4. Linear regressions fitted to the annual data used in the charts, 1948—1974,
show that a time trend (T), has a significant positive influence on the relation- Over
ships with the unemployment rate (UR) and a positive but not significant influ- cure
ence on those with the employment ratio (E/P): a di
wan
LHC 1.11—0.52UR +0.11TR2 =0.25, but
(0.38)(1.61) (2.57) view






LCPI =—134.35+2.39E/P+0.09TR20.68. in tl
(—5.73)(5.37) (1.84) slow
has
The unemployment rate is not significant in either equation, though it has the stat
appropriate sign; the employment ratio is significant in both equations. Wes
5. The unemployment ratio differs from the unemployment rate in that the tries
latter uses labor force (employment plus unemployment) as the denominator rr rather than population. Nevertheless, the ratio and the rate are highly correlated 0
because of the dominant influence of the numerator upon their fluctuations. twei
virt!.
rece
Iii
anot
intl
Repr